THE STRATEGIC GAME TO UNDERMINE THE
IRISH VOTE ON LISBON
Kieran Allen
School of Sociology
UCD
Abstract:
The vote on Lisbon is already being
re-fought. Elite think tanks and senior academics on the Yes are marshalling
arguments to undermine the democratic will of the Irish people. In this report,
we draw on the writings of the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, to analyse
the strategic games being currently played by these elite
groups.
Political activists and media commentators
rarely read sociological texts because they are sometimes written in an
impenetrable style. But an exception should be made for a short, six page
article from the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu entitled Neoliberalism
as a Conservative Revolution. It was originally delivered as a speech in
1997 - in other words, before the Wall St Crash of 2008 when the neoliberal
dogma still seemed to be unassailable.
The article makes a number of key points
that are significant for anyone seeking to understand the twin crisis of
legitimacy that is currently affecting Ireland.
Our ruling elite destroyed some of their
political capital when the population gave a decisive rejection to Lisbon Treaty
on June 12th -despite, or possibly because, of their internal solidarity in
marshalling the Yes argument. Co-incidentally, the economic model which served
our rulers well during the Celtic Tiger years entered a period of crisis on both
a local and global stage. Ireland's peculiar role in undercutting tax rates and
the European social wage in order to serve US corporations has itself been
undercut by countries in Eastern Europe. And this has developed in the context
of a 1930s scale crash which undermines the rhetoric about 'de-regulated' market
forces.
In his article Bourdieu defined
neo-liberalism as a 'conservative revolution'. In the name of flexibility, it
seeks a return to a more radical capitalist order that shifts power to the
wealthy. It was, however, a unique form of conservatism
because:
It is not like in other times a question
of evoking an idealized past by the exaltation of blood and soil - agrarian
and archaic themes. This new type of conservative revolution appeals to
progress, reason, and science (economics, in this event) to justify
restoration and seeks in this way to dispatch progressive thought and action
to an archaic past.
In a subsequent article, Bourdieu pointed
out that the neoliberal discourse was often backed up by a new set of 'cultural
producers'. These were the experts who emerged from the world of
think-tanks and academic institutions to present an aura of objective research.
There were also communications advisors, who raised the discourse of
neoliberalism from the everyday to the academic speak.
Through such mechanisms, the neo-liberals
proposed an 'unsurpassable horizon of thought and the end of critical utopias
(based on) an economic fatalism'. 1 His point was that
neoliberalism tried to reduce the range of political alternatives in the name of
a spurious globalisation. A mythology was created through the endlessly
repeated story line that there was only room for acquiescence with 'market
forces'. While neoliberals proclaimed a world of limitless individual choice,
they assiduously tried to reduce real political choice to zero. The right wing
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman summed up the message with his
concept of the 'golden straightjacket.' Every country which wanted to develop,
he argued, had to put on the straightjacket of 'market forces'. According to
Friedman,
Once your country puts it on, its
political choices get reduced to Pepsi or Coke - to slight nuances of taste,
slight nuances of policy, slight alterations in design to account for local
tradition, some loosening here or there, but never any deviation from the core
golden rules.2
These insights serve as
a useful starting point for examining current strategies for overturning the
will of the Irish people.
HOW WILL WE ANSWER TO
BRUSSELS?
The leaders of the EU have subjected the
political establishment in Ireland to considerable pressure to develop a
strategy to overturn the June 12th vote. There is hardly any disagreement in the
Yes camp that this should occur. But they plead on tactical grounds for more
time because the consequences of a second defeat would be
devastating.
In pushing for a repeat vote, the political
establishment have revealed their contempt for the limited form of democracy
that we currently enjoy. Referenda are blunt instruments as they force unlikely
forces to combine around a simple Yes or No position. But they are equally blunt
for both sides. If the Yes side had won the vote, it is barely conceivable that
the No side could call for a repeat vote.
Once the vote was
counted, the elected Taoiseach and his government were formally mandated to
implement the decision of the people. Yet at no stage has the current government
undertaken to promote the democratic view. They were mandated to press for the
rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and, as that treaty demanded the agreement of all
EU nations, they had considerable leverage. Ireland's effective veto on the
treaty could have been exercised. If they had done this, the Lisbon Treaty would
have died and the EU would have been forced to consider a new treaty which would
have taken some account of the deep alienation that many Europeans feel about
its undemocratic structures.
Instead the Irish government defined their
own people's decision as a problem and conspired to undermine it. Sarkozy and
Barrosso were only able to employ intimidatory tactics because the Irish elite
facilitated them.
In the run up to the EU Council meeting on
December 11th, a flurry of publications has emerged from the Yes
which outlines their emerging strategy. The Institute of International and
European Affairs, describes itself as a policy think tank whose 'corporate and
foundation members' are composed of 'investment banks, government
departments, and industrial conglomerates' It has just issued a report
entitled Ireland's Future after Lisbon which warns that if the
Lisbon Treaty were abandoned in accordance with the Irish vote, there
would be 'serious consequences for this country in terms of its good standing
and influence' A sub-committee of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European
Affairs has issued a report entitled Ireland's Future in the European
Union: Challenges Issues and Options. This is turn draws on another, as
yet unpublished, report from the Dublin European Institute composed mainly of
academics who played a prominent role in the Yes camp.
The tone and rhetoric of the two reports
resembles the standard managerialist discourse used by corporate groups such as
developers when they face a difficulty with local residents over planning
issues. As part of a now familiar process of 'stakeholder consultation', the
corporation, or the consultants they employ, firstly, engage in a 'scoping
exercise' by assembling the arguments of their opponents in a crude and
simple manner. Once these have been re-constructed, a set of 'options' are
offered for dealing with 'the problem'. The options, however, tend to be
structured in such a way that opponents are left with little option but to
choose the least worse - which happens to be the original choice of the
corporation. As a gesture to their demoralised opponents, the corporate
developers then grant some tokens which signify that the 'stakeholders' gained
minimal recognition from entering the process.
In a similar manner, the new reports from
the Yes camp purport to analyse the reasons why people voted No. They then
produce a set of 'options' which effectively rule out the one the Irish people
voted for - the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty - as being 'unrealistic'. They
also argue that a renegotiation is 'unrealistic' and that a call for new
protocols might also be difficult. The only option, it appears is for the Irish
people to correct their mistake in a repeat vote after they gain some 'legally
binding' declarations which satisfy their 'concerns'.
We shall examine the two reports in the
context of Bourdieu's insights about neoliberalism.
Progressive European versus backward
sceptics :
One of the main arguments being adduced by
the political establishment for explaining the No vote was a lack of
understanding on the part of the Irish people. It is recognised that 73 percent
of the population support membership of the EU but it is claimed that 'Ireland
lags behind other EU Member states in terms of people's knowledge of the
EU'3. It is further claimed that 'a citizen's level of understanding
has a significant effect on policy choices that citizens makes about the
union'.4 It follows, therefore, that the Irish people need more
education so that they will better 'understand' the complexities. Among the
social engineering measures proposed by the progressive Yes establishment are
'incentivising the posting of Irish journalists to Brussels'5 and a
more prominent role for 'the history of European integration since 1950s' in the
Irish school curriculum. Through such measures, it is assumed that that lack of
'understanding' that led to a negative vote on Lisbon can be overcome and future
disasters avoided.
The IIEA report adds a further dimension to
the 'backward' No versus 'progressive' Yes polarity. They claim that the No
side's arguments can be divided into 'sovereignty' and 'identity'
positions. However, they claim that the 'identity position' is often
'Europhobic' seeing the European Union as the 'Godless Empire' which seeks to
impose extreme secularism and to undermine traditional concepts of society,
family and personal morality'6. Against such backward reactionary
thought, the progressive modernisers suffer in silence while invoking two
defence measures. They note 'that the debate in these sensitive areas may
reflect underlying attitudes of a nationalist and religiously fundamental nature
which must be taken into account in any development of strategy'7 and
imply that statements of the Catholic hierarchy may be needed to counteract
them. A declaration also needs to be extracted from Brussels that assures the
fundamentalists that abortion or gay marriage will not be imposed on holy
Ireland. When it comes to saving Europe's free market economy and its security
apparatus, morsels of comfort can be thrown to the
ignorant.
There is one problem, however, with this
opposition between the rational, progressive Yes voter and the backward,
ignorant NO voter: it bears no relationship to the facts.
Knowledge and understanding of the EU is a
difficult item to measure as it has many dimensions and the result might be
influenced by the measuring instrument employed. It is doubtful, however, a
population which has undergone a number of referenda on EU has less knowledge on
the subject than people in other countries. Moreover, there is no evidence to
show that a lack of knowledge or understanding of Europe is strongly related to
a rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, there is some patchy evidence to
suggest the opposite. The Eurobarometer poll which was conducted in the
immediate aftermath of the vote - and hence probably the most reliable- noted
that Yes voters tended to give 'one-dimensional' responses on why they voted.
Their responses were related to issues that were extraneous to the actual Lisbon
treaty. So by far the largest grouping gave as their reasons two very vague
statements to the effect that ' It was in the best interest of Ireland' and
'Ireland gets a lot of benefit from the EU'. Specific reference to items in the
treaty that went beyond 'Ireland's interest' were far
fewer.8
The emphasis of the IIEA on particular
'ethical reasons' for the NO vote is also misplaced. Only 2 percent of No
voters mentioned abortion, euthanasia or gay marriage as their
reasons.9 We might actually conclude that there were more people in
favour of a greater access to abortion on the No side because one of its key
support bases was the left and young people.
22 percent of No voters did give as their
reason 'I do not know enough about the Treaty and would not want to vote for
something that I am not familiar with'.10 But this was a perfectly
rational response to a treaty that was deliberately written in an
incomprehensible format in order to cover for the fact that it was substantially
the same as the EU constitution rejected by the people of France and Holland. It
was also a perfectly suitable response to a government that refused to provide
copies of the treaty to its citizens and instead urged them to trust their
leaders when dealing with complex documents. Nor should it imply that the No
camp had less understanding of the treaty. One could hardly vote Yes and
then assent to the statement that one did not understand
it.!
The Cultural Producers of
Assent
Faced with some difficulty from their
population, the neoliberals have turned to the cultural producers from the
academia to give more sophistication to their argument for assent. If the
Bishops cannot be called on to herd their flock, then possibly the aura of
'objective research' might influence the population.
When Professor Brigid Laffan appeared at the
Oireachtas Committee hearing she argued that while the EU may appear elitist
from a national viewpoint, the complex nature of its institutional structure
cannot be judged in national terms. She advanced two specific
arguments.
1.'As it is not like a nation state, it will
always be thinner in democratic terms than a nation
state'11
2. That the EU is going through a
process of democratisation but, such a process takes a long time. 'We will
not wake up in the morning and find that suddenly the EU is deeply democratic
from top to bottom. Nation states were forged and became democratic over long
periods and the EU will face the same process'12
Both these arguments can be
disputed.
There is no iron law which suggests that
transnational bodies need to be any less democratic than national bodies. As
there are relatively few such bodies which claim extensive sovereignty over
nation states, such an hypothesis cannot be justified by empirical evidence. In
historical terms, the US emerged as a trans-state body but it can hardly be
argued that it was any less democratic than the British empire of the day.
Moreover, if a greater form of democracy is not available in transnational
bodies, then what inducement do citizens have for giving more powers to such
bodies? If - and we dispute this- democracy is inevitably 'thinner' in the EU,
why should citizens who want greater democracy voluntarily give it more
power?
Nor is it by many means clear that democracy
is the result of a long process of maturation. We need think only of two cases
to suggest otherwise. The overthrow of apartheid regime and the winning of
majority voting in South Africa came rather sharply and suddenly. The democratic
achievements of the black population were won in opposition to everything the
South African state stood for in previous decades. Similarly, the achievement of
democracy in Spain came as a combination of growing protests and a decision of
the Francoist regime to seek an accommodation with its opponents. But it can
hardly be argued that the tradition of Spanish monarchism or fascism slowly
prepared the way for democracy.
Ironically Professor Laffan herself reveals
limits of democracy in the EU when she asserts that its very structure allows
for 'centre left' or 'centre right' politics but not for 'extremes'. One of her
instances of 'extreme' is a high level of government regulation of the economy.
She states that
Euroscepticism of the left tends towards a
belief that the EU is not sufficiently regulated and that social supports are
not strong enough…. The Europe available to us can never be those models
favoured by either the extreme left or the extreme right. Europe is a centrist
project and moves marginally centre-left or
centre-right.13
But if voters are locked out from taking
such 'extreme' views, how can the institutional structure be said to be
democratic? And if political choice is limited by the EU's institutional
structure to marginal moves between the centre left and centre right, is that
not a guarantee to the powerful that their rule will never be disturbed? That,
to most people, constitute a very limited range of democratic
alternatives.
Politics must follow
economics
During the referendum campaign, the Yes side
attempted to argue that a No vote would frighten away foreign investment. But
yet they were forced to retreat from this position when their opponents
pointed to how the French case. The
inflow of foreign direct investment to France shot up from $32.6bn (€20.8bn) in
2004 to $81 (€51.6bn) in 2005 when the French voted no to the EU constitution
and also to $81bn (€51.6bn) in 2006. Irish opponents of the Lisbon treaty did
not claim that the No vote would be good for investment, merely that it would
have no detrimental effect.
However the neoliberal mindset cannot break
from its recourse to economic fatalism. It needs to suggest that political
choice must follow the economics of market forces because, as they have seen,
democracy can be a rather troublesome affair. If political choice is further
limited to what the markets dictate, then this considerably reduces this
troublesome and messy business.
An example of this line of reasoning
re-appears in the Oireachtas Committee report on the relation between a No vote
and Ireland economic development.
The report baldly states that 'Ireland's
decision not to ratify the Lisbon Treaty…. could seriously damage its
competitiveness in attracting foreign direct investment'14
The managing director of Microsoft and other
cultural producers such as Professor Francis Ruane and Professor John Fitzgerald
volunteered to lend objective authority to this bald statement. With the
certainty that only a professor of the ESRI could muster, John Fitzgerald states
even more baldly, ' Ireland has suffered a significant economic blow as a result
of its failure to pass the Lisbon Treaty'.15
The golden straightjacket is therefore ready
for wear. If we want economic development, we have no choice but to put it on
and vote Yes a second time.
The fatalism of our cultural producers is
again mistaken because they can produce no evidence that there is any link
between a possible decline in Foreign Direct Investment and the vote on the
Lisbon Treaty. Instead they cover their tracks by claiming that it is too
early yet to tell if there was a fall-off because of the No vote.
Yet clearly there is no direct link between
the flow of Foreign Direct Investment and the June 12th vote on
Lisbon. If there is a fall in FDI over a longer period, it will have far more to
do with structural shifts in the global economy than an Irish vote on Lisbon.
Historically, Ireland has enjoyed a high share of US investment but changes in
US tax policy and the more vulnerable position of US corporations after the new
Wall St crash may affect this. Ireland's vote has no impact on its status
as a full EU member with full access to EU markets and therefore the economic
options facing US companies remain precisely the same. Unless, of course, one
wishes to argue that Ireland's political influence in Europe is a factor - but
that can only be ascertained if there is full disclosure of how exactly that
influence is wielded for the benefit of US corporations.
Contrary to the economic fatalism of
neo-liberals, peoples and nation do of course have political choices. The Irish
vote has given its government a huge leverage to promote a more democratic
Europe. Its failure to do so has nothing to do with 'economic realities' but has
to do with its total immersion in the elite culture of the EU and its
unwillingness to respond to the democratic wishes of its own
population.
TURNING THE TABLES
The neoliberals have found an extra line of
argument which they hope will bring them Yes vote in a new referendum. They
claim that the current global economic crisis shows the need for a more
integrated Europe and that only the Lisbon Treaty paves the way for this. In
fact, the current economic crisis shows the exact opposite.
The Wall Street Crash of 2008 was triggered
by de-regulated financial markets which enabled bankers to transfer billions of
toxic loans across the global economy. It had also deeper roots in a problem of
'excess savings' which many corporations experienced. Faced with uniform
pressure to reduce the share of national economies allocated to wages,
corporations faced shrinking demand and experienced over-accumulation. Instead
of investing in industry and services, they chose to use a growing proportion of
their capital for speculative purpose. The neo-liberal dogmas greatly
facilitated them in this.
The EU has embraced these same dogmas and
therefore its political structures must also be seen as contributing to the
economic crisis. The Irish Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, for example, opposed
the imposition of regulations on hedge funds. An expert group which was
appointed to examine the issue was composed almost entirely of bankers and
docile economists. Not surprisingly, it reported that
It is suggested that additional
regulation, which does not and arguably cannot accommodate the need for
unrestricted investment freedom or the international organisation of business
models, is likely to fail… In particular, regulation of investment strategies
is the very antithesis of the hedge fund business and would be
misguided.16
The German Finance Minister Peter Steinbruck
initially attempted to claim that the crisis merely affected the Anglo-American
version of capitalism but he soon found that the European version was also a
causal factor.
The Lisbon Treaty represents the
codification of a series of neo-liberal measures that have shaped European
politics in recent years. When read in the light of the current crisis, they
provide significant insights into why whole treaty needs to be rejected and
replaced by one which develops a social Europe. The Lisbon Treaty builds on past
treaties to include the following items
- an article which states that ' all
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between
Members states and third countries shall be prohibited'.
- Article which states that the internal
market 'includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted'.
- A general principle that any aid granted
by a member state which distorts competition by favouring certain goods is
incompatible with the internal market.
- Powers to fine countries who are in
breach the Growth and Stability pact - which, therefore, restricts borrowing
in a recession.
- Complete independence for the European
Central Bank which enables it to be more answerable to the needs of bankers
than the wider European population.
These neo-liberal measures have already
hindered efforts to reduce the social suffering caused by the economic crisis.
The ECB was slower, for example, than the US Federal Reserve in cutting interest
rates because its focus was on fighting inflation - which appeared to be rising
earlier in the year- rather than in stimulating job creation. Attempts to give
state support to any one grouping which might distort the market is questioned
by the EU Commission because it has been legally charged with doing precisely
this. (The argument raised by Professor John Fitzgerald that Ireland was forced
to give an additional bail out to foreign banks - as if the bail-out to Irish
banks was not enough- because of the No vote is absurd. In fact, it was caused
by the very EU treaties he has consistently supported!). Attempts to reflate an
economy comes up against the Growth and Stability Pact as Ireland will find in
the coming years.
There is a need for a European wide response
to the current crisis - but it is one that the Irish supporters of the Yes vote
deeply abhor. The banking system which has helped cause the crisis should be
taken into public ownership across Europe and its credit lines socialised so
that they facilitate long term investment in services and manufacturing rather
than in speculation. There is a need for a massive public works programme across
Europe that is linked to serious measure to tackle climate change. These might
include a major expansion of the public transport system across the continent so
that air flight and car travel night be reduced. They might also include a
programme of house insulation to give work to unemployed building workers. But
this would require a political structure that promotes a co-ordinated programme
of public spending rather than the tokenistic re-packing of existing measures
which the EU is currently proposing. EU wide regulation should also be invoked
to break the power of hedge funds through tough regulations on the movement of
finance.
But even the slightest move in this
direction would come up against the limits of the Lisbon treaty. It is time that
EU policy makers realised that the neo-liberal era is dead and that the Irish
vote has given them an opportunity to remove its policy provisions from a
constitution for Europe. Instead of apologising for its people, the Irish
government should be proudly claiming we gave Europe an opportunity to move in
new directions for new times.
